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COMMENT
Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Wrongful
Obliteration of the Tort of Invasion of
Privacy Through the Publication of
Private Facts
Introduction
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ."1 The United
States Supreme Court has not interpreted this clause to mean that free-
dom of speech is an absolute right.2 The First Amendment is vital to a
free society, but it does not protect all speech regardless of the damaging
effects that it may have. A competing interest is the right of privacy.
State legislatures have criminalized dissemination of private facts and
have created statutory rights to privacy that protect people from public
disclosure of private facts.'
Historically, the right to privacy has been perceived as a necessary
right in our society. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first introduced
the theory of the right to privacy in 1890.1 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 652D defines the tort of invasion of privacy through the
publication of private facts as the publication of a matter concerning the
private life of another that is highly offensive to a reasonable person and
that is not of legitimate public concern.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (first amendment "protection even as
to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited" in situations in which the disclosure of military
information is involved); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic.").
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1983) (states that an offense under this section shall
constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082,
§ 775.083, or § 775.084); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-20 (1976) (a person who violates § 49-7-3 "shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than ten nor more than
one hundred dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor more than six months, or
both such fine and imprisonment.").
4. Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652D (1977).
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The major cases dealing with the tort of invasion of privacy through
the publication of private facts have balanced the right of privacy with
the First Amendment. For example, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
the Court held that the First Amendment protected the media from lia-
bility for publishing private facts that were a matter of public record.6 In
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, the Court held that the First
Amendment protected the press from liability for publishing information
placed in the public domain regarding a juvenile offender.7 In Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court held that the First Amendment
protected a newspaper from liability for the publication of lawfully ob-
tained truthful information regarding a matter of public significance,
"absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."8 On the
other hand, other courts, in balancing this issue, have concluded that the
First Amendment did not protect the media from liability for the publi-
cation of private facts.9
In a recent case, Florida Star v. B.J.F.,' ° the statutory right of pri-
vacy directly clashed with the freedom of the press. The United States
Supreme Court held that imposing damages on the newspaper The Flor-
ida Star (Star) for publishing the name of a rape victim violated the First
Amendment. 1' In Florida Star, the Star had obtained information re-
garding the identity of the rape victim from a record that was confiden-
tial under Florida statutes.' 2 The rape victim's assailant remained at
large. As a result of the publication, B.J.F. "received harassing phone
calls, required mental health counseling, was forced to move from her
home, and was even threatened with rape again.""
The District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the Florida trial
court's award of $75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in puni-
tive damages for the newspaper's negligence based upon its violation of
the confidentiality statute.14 The Supreme Court of Florida denied dis-
cretionary review.' 5 Upon petition, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.16 In reversing the District Court of Appeal of Flor-
ida, Justice Marshall, writing the five-vote majority opinion, ruled that
"imposing damages on appellant for publishing B.J.F.'s name violates the
6. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
7. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
8. 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979).
9. See infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
10. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
11. Id. at 2608.
12. Id. at 2606; FLA. STAT. §§ 119.07(3)(h), 794.03 (1983) (making it unlawful to publish
the name of a rape victim).
13. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2614 (White, J., dissenting).
14. Florida Star v. B.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2607.
16. Id.
First Amendment."' 17 The Court held that "where a newspaper pub-
lishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment
may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfactorily
served by imposing liability... under the facts of this case.""8
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
finding the statute underinclusive. He reasoned that "a law cannot be
regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order,' and thus as justi-
fying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable dam-
age to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."' 9 The statute in
question imposed a prohibition on the press but did not place a prohibi-
tion on dissemination through gossip.20 According to Justice Scalia, fail-
ure to prohibit other means of circulation leaves the rape victim subject
to discomfort at least as great as her discomfort from publication by the
media to people to whom she is only a name."'
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, strongly dissented. Stressing the drastic nature of the crime
involved, the dissenters explained that "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the
'ultimate violation of self.' 22 The dissenters further argued that by
holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not a state in-
terest of the highest order, the Court accepted the appellant's invitation
to obliterate the tort of invasion of privacy through the publication of
private facts.2 3 Justice White reasoned that the public has no interest in
the names, addresses, and phone numbers of victims of crime and there is
"no public interest in immunizing the press from liability where a State's
efforts to protect a victim's privacy have failed."2
This Comment examines the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Florida Star v. B.JF that a rape victim's statutory right to pri-
vacy does not override a newspaper's constitutional right to freedom of
speech. To make this determination, the Court has balanced the value of
publishing a rape victim's name that is not a matter of public record and
not open to public inspection against the first amendment right to free-
dom of speech. Part I of this Comment examines the background of the
right to privacy and the conflict between that right and the First Amend-
ment. Part II presents the facts, the procedural history, the majority
17. Id. at 2608.
18. Id. at 2613.
19. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. lit at 2614 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977)).
23. Id. at 2618.
24. Id. at 2619.
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holding, the concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion as discussed
in Florida Star v. B.J.F Part III criticizes the Court's constitutional
analysis of the conflicting rights in Florida Star in light of the balance the
Court struck, its interpretation of the applicable precedent, the intended
application of Cox Broadcasting, and the test the Court applied based on
noncontrolling case law.
This Comment concludes that the rape victim's right of privacy and
the state's interest in nondisclosure necessarily outweigh the right of the
press to publish the victim's name and deserve protection when the name
is neither a matter of public record nor a matter of legitimate public con-
cern. As Justice White indicated, the conclusion that imposing damages
on the Star violates the First Amendment ignores the plight of the rape
victim and virtually wipes out the tort of invasion of privacy through the
publication of private facts.25
I. Background
Background for the issues raised in Florida Star v. B.J..E includes
the precedents to Florida Star and the history of the tort of invasion of
privacy. The following cases concern a tension between protecting the
media's right to free speech and a person's interest in privacy. The
courts have been forced to choose between these two valuable interests.
A. Precedents to Florida Star v. B.J.F.
This section first discusses cases in which the Court found that the
media's disclosure of private facts was protected by the First Amend-
ment. Next, this section addresses cases in which the Court placed limits
on the media's disclosure of private facts.
1. Protected Disclosure of Private Facts
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn26 addressed first amendment pro-
tection of the press from an action for invasion of privacy based on the
publication of a rape victim's name. Although factually similar to Flor-
ida Star, all of the Justices agreed that it did not control Florida Star.
Unlike Florida Star, the victim's name in Cox Broadcasting was already a
matter of public record. In Cox Broadcasting, the father of a deceased
rape victim brought an action against the Cox Broadcasting Corporation
for the broadcast of the deceased rape victim's name.27 The reporter ob-
tained the information from the indictments, which were public records
open to public inspection.28 The victim's father relied on a Georgia stat-
25. Id. at 2618.
26. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
27. Id. at 474.
28. Id at 472.
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ute29 that makes it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's name. He
succeeded in the trial court and in the Georgia Supreme Court.30 The
Georgia Supreme Court declared that the statute was representative of a
state policy that "a rape victim's name was not a matter of public con-
cern," and upheld the statute as a "legitimate limitation on the First
Amendment's freedom of expression."'"
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 32 Justice White deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, which held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose
sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection. ' 33 Justice White reasoned that
in modem society, individuals have limited time and resources with
which to observe first hand the operations of government. As a result,
individuals must rely on the press to inform them in a convenient manner
of the facts of those operations.34 Thus, he declared, "[g]reat responsibil-
ity is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accu-
rately the proceedings of government, and official records and documents
open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.,
35
Justice White found that the judicial proceedings arising from the
prosecutions of crime are events of legitimate public concern and that the
press has the responsibility of reporting these to the public.3 6 Justice
White then turned to the important nature of judicial proceedings and
stated that the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials by scrutiniz-
ing the administration of justice and thus permitting the public to benefit
from the effects of public scrutiny.37
Moreover, Justice White recognized that "the interests in privacy
fade when the information involved already appears on the public rec-
ord."' 38 He concluded that because the state placed the information in
the public domain on official court records, it must have decided that the
public interest was being served.39 Justice White did, however, limit the
holding in Cox Broadcasting to the circumstances presented in that
case.
40
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, the Supreme Court
held that an order of the district court precluding the press from publish-
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
30. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 474.
31. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (Ga. 1973).
32. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 495.
33. Id.
34. IdL at 491.
35. Id. at 491-92.
36. Id.
37. Id at 492.
38. Id. at 494-95.
39. Id. at 495.
40. Id, at 496-97.
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ing the name or picture of a juvenile offender violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 4' In that case the state charged an eleven-year-old
boy, Larry Donnell Brewer, with second degree murder for the fatal
shooting of a railroad switchman.42 The juvenile offender appeared at a
detention hearing in Oklahoma County Juvenile Court attended by re-
porters who learned his name and took his photograph.43 Newspapers in
the county printed a number of stories using the boy's name and photo-
graph.' The juvenile was arraigned at a closed hearing at which the
judge entered a pretrial order enjoining publication of the name and pic-
ture of the juvenile.45 The district court denied the newspaper's motion
to quash the order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also denied the news-
paper's writs of prohibition and mandamus, relying on Oklahoma stat-
utes.46 These statutes provide that "juvenile proceedings are to be held in
private 'unless specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted in pub-
lic,' and that juvenile records are open to public inspection 'only by order
of the court.' "'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the in-
formation was placed in the public domain and that the district court's
order abridged the freedom of the press in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 48 Even though the judge did not expressly or-
der the hearing to be public as the state statute permitted, members of
the press were present at the hearing with the full knowledge of the pre-
siding judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel.49 The Court found
that there was "no evidence that [the newspaper] acquired the informa-
tion unlawfully or even without the State's implicit approval."5 °
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court struck down a
West Virginia statute that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish the
name of any juvenile offender without the juvenile court's approval. 51
The statute prohibited publication even when the information was law-
fully obtained.52 The challenged statute provided: "[N]or shall the name
of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be
published in any newspaper without a written order of the court .... )53
41. 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977).
42. Id. at 309.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Martin, 618 P.2d 944 (Okla. 1980).
47. 430 U.S. at 309 (quoting OkLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1111, 1125 (Supp. 1976)). The
district court's decision is not published.
48. Id. at 311-12.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id.
51. 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (interpreting W. VA. CODE §§ 49-7-3, 49-7-20 (1976)).
52. Id.
53. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976).
FLORIDA STAR v B.J.F.
In Daily Mail, the newspaper learned the name of a juvenile, who had
been arrested for allegedly killing another youth, by monitoring the po-
lice band radio frequency and by asking eyewitnesses.5 4 They published
articles including the juvenile's name in their description of the event.5
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "[t]he as-
serted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender
to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of
criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully ob-
tained." 6 Further, the court found that, assuming the statute served a
state interest of the highest order, the statute failed to serve that interest
because it was underinclusive5 7 It did not accomplish its stated purpose
because it only restricted newspapers. The electronic media and any
other forms of publication were left free from restrictions.5 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Chief Justice Burger de-
livered the opinion of the Court. 9 Looking for guidance from
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,' Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,61 and Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,62 Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that these opinions did not directly control Daily Mail;
he did find, however, that they all suggested strongly that "if a newspa-
per lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public signifi-
cance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."63
The Court found that the statute advanced the state interest of pro-
tecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender with this criminal stat-
ute.6" Chief Justice Burger concluded that this state interest did notjustify the application of a criminal penalty. 65 Moreover, the Court
found that because the statute did not include other forms of publication,
54. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 99.
55. Id.
56. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978).
57. Id
58. Id
59. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 98.
60. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). The Court found that a state must demonstrate that punishing a
newspaper's publication of facts was necessary to further the state interests asserted in order to
prove that the First Amendment was not violated. Id at 843. The Court declared unconstitu-
tional a Virginia statute making it a crime to publish information concerning confidential pro-
ceedings regarding complaints about alleged disabilities and misconduct of state court judges.
Id. at 838. The Court held that the publication touched upon the core of the First Amend-
ment and that the state's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions were insuf-
ficient to justify the encroachments on freedom of speech. Id.
61. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
62. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
63. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
64. Id at 104.
65. Id.
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such as radio, it did not accomplish its stated purpose. 6
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned,
"'Freedom of speech thus does not comprehend the right to speak on
any subject at any time, . . . and the press is not free to publish with
impunity everything and anything it desires to publish.' "67 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Court has rejected absolutes in favor of a more
delicate balancing that carefully weighs the conflicting interests to deter-
mine which demands the greater protection under the particular circum-
stances presented.68
In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, a state's interest in preserving the
anonymity of its juvenile offenders, which he perceived as an interest of
the highest order, far outweighed any minimal interference with the First
Amendment that a ban on publication of the youths' names would en-
tail.69 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Court, however, because
the statute failed to mention other effective forms of publication and
therefore largely failed to achieve its purpose.70 Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed that a generally effective ban on publication that applied to all
forms of mass communication, including electronic and print media,
would be constitutional. 71
In Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., after a rape
victim testified against her assailant at his trial for rape, the press ran her
videotaped testimony on the evening news. 72 The Doe court held that
Cox Broadcasting was controlling and that the First Amendment pro-
tected the action taken by the press.73 As in Cox Broadcasting, the televi-
sion company obtained the information from a source already open to
public view-a public criminal trial.74 The court did not invalidate Flor-
ida Statute section 794.03, however, because it recognized that under cer-
tain circumstances, section 794.03 could be applied to protect privacy
interests without violating the First Amendment.75
Despite upholding the constitutionality of the media's actions, the
court found the actions to be distasteful. The court added, "Although
we affirm the trial court in all respects, we do so reluctantly because the
information disclosed during the television broadcast appears to us to
66. Id at 104-05.
67. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (citations
omitted)).
68. Id. at 106.
69. Id. at 107.
70. Id. at 110.
71. Id
72. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Florida Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
73. Id
74. Id at 329-30.
75. Id at 330.
have been completely unnecessary to the story being presented."76 The
court criticized the media's lack of sensitivity to the rights of others."
The court sympathized with the victim's situation and reasoned that
prior to this trial, the victim was simply an ordinary citizen, lacking fame
and prominence, who unwillingly became a victim of the crime of rape.7"
The court reasoned that "[t]he publication added little or nothing to the
sordid and unhappy story; yet, that brief little-or-nothing addition may
well affect appellant's well-being for years to come."7 9
2. Unprotected Disclosure of Private Facts
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee For
Freedom of the Press, the United States Supreme Court held that publica-
tion of criminal identification records could constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy."0 The Court stated that Exemption 7(C), an exception to the
Freedom of Information Act," prohibits disclosure of the contents of an
FBI rap sheet to a third party because it constitutes an unwarranted in-
vasion of privacy." Exemption 7(C) excludes from the statute's disclo-
sure requirements "records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes... 'to the extent that the production of such [materials] ...
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.' "83 Exemption 7(C) requires the balancing of the pri-
vacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of the rap sheets
against the public interest in their release.84
The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that be-
cause the events in a rap sheet had been previously disclosed to the pub-
lic, there is no privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of a federal
compilation of these events.8 5 The Court found that "there is a vast dif-
ference between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search.., and a computerized summary."8 6 The Court concluded:
The privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap
sheet information will always be high. When the subject of such a
rap sheet is a private citizen and when the information is in the
Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of
"what the Government is up to," the privacy interest.., is in fact
at its apex while the ...public interest in disclosure is at its
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. IM. at 331.
79. Id.
80. 109 S. Ct. 1468, 1476-85 (1989).
81. Id.; Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982 Supp. IV).
82. 109 S. Ct. at 1476-85.
83. Id. at 1472 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(o)).
84. Id. at 1476.
85. I&
86. Id. at 1477.
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nadir.8 7
In Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld an action for invasion of the right of pri-
vacy even though the court acknowledged that the rapes that occurred
were of public concern. In Nappier, the media did not mention the wo-
men's names but publicized their identity without names by televising the
women."8 A South Carolina statute 9 made it a misdemeanor to publish
the name of a person who had been raped.9" The object of the law was to
foster personal protection of the woman involved and "to encourage a
free report of the crime by the victim."91 The court reasoned, "Fear of
publicity might deter her from notifying the police. Thus, the public in-
terest is advanced by the statute: the crime is investigated promptly and
the injured person is shielded."92
The right to privacy and the First Amendment also directly con-
fficted in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. " In Briscoe, the
plaintiff filed suit for invasion of privacy because the defendant published
an article disclosing truthful but embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff's past criminal act of hijacking a truck eleven years earlier.94
The plaintiff claimed that as a result of the publication, his eleven-year-
old daughter and his friends learned of the incident and thereafter
scorned and abandoned him.95
The California Supreme Court recognized that "[a]cceptance of the
right of privacy has grown with the increasing capability of the mass
media and electronic devices with their capacity to destroy an individ-
ual's anonymity, intrude upon his most intimate activities, and expose his
most personal characteristics to public gaze." 96 The court commented
that thirty-six states now recognize a common law right to privacy and
that California has recognized this right for forty years.9 7
The court found that reports of current crimes are protected by the
First Amendment because they serve to encourage witnesses to come
forth and friends to give aid to victims.98 The court stated, however, that
identification of past offenders does not serve these "public-interest func-
tions"99 because identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes
87. Id. at 1485 (quoting from the NEw YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS at 7 (Oct. 5, 1972)).
88. 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (1962).
90. 322 F.2d at 503.
91. Id at 504.
92. Id
93. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
94. Id at 532, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
95. Id. at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
96. Id., 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
97. Id. at 534, 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
98. Id at 536-37, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
99. Id at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
will not aid the administration of justice and will not serve "to bring
forth witnesses or obtain succor for victims."" °
The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the plain-
tiff's identity as a former hijacker was not newsworthy and was of mini-
mal social value, that the plaintiff had become an anonymous member of
the community, that revealing one's criminal past is grossly offensive,
and that the plaintiff did not voluntarily consent to the publicity. 101 Fur-
ther, the court argued that "the state has a compelling interest in the
efficacy of penal systems in rehabilitating criminals and returning them
as productive and law-abiding citizens to the society whence they
came.""°2 Invading a person's privacy through the publication of private
facts scars that person in the eyes of many and takes away his or her
opportunity to return to society as an average citizen.
In State v. Evjue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the slight
restriction of the freedom of the press prescribed by a statute prohibiting
the publication of the name of a rape victim was fully justified.10 3 The
court found that the statute was intended to save women who have been
the subject of sexual assault from embarrassment and offensive publicity,
and to aid law enforcement officers in more readily obtaining evidence
for the prosecution of such crimes.104 The court reasoned that rape vic-
tims suffer far more than victims of any other class of crime.10 5 There-
fore, rape victims' interest in privacy should be given greater weight than
victims of other crimes.
These background cases are helpful in determining how the balanc-
ing of the two interests of free speech and privacy should be approached.
They serve as examples of how various courts have dealt with the issue of
balancing privacy interests against the First Amendment.
B. The Tort of Invasion of Privacy
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first developed the con-
cept of a legal right to privacy in their famous law review article. 10 6
Warren and Brandeis began their article with the observation that the
idea that "the individual shall have full protection in person and in prop-
erty is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found neces-
sary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such
protection."' 7 They further commented that the scope of these legal
rights broadened gradually, and now "the right to life has come to mean
100. Id., 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
101. Id. at 541-42, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
102. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
103. 33 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Wis. 1948).
104. Id. at 309.
105. Id.
106. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 193.
107. Id. at 193.
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the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone."108
Warren and Brandeis warned that such protection of privacy was
necessary because the press had overstepped the bounds of decency and
because gossip had become a trade." 9 They stated:
The intensity and complexity of life... have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world, and man.., has become more sensi-
tive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and invention
have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury. 1
The authors proposed that the right to privacy does not protect in-
formation that is of public or general interest.' They reasoned that the
law must protect those persons whose affairs are no legitimate concern of
the community from being dragged into an undesired publicity. In addi-
tion, all persons must be protected from having matters that they may
properly prefer to keep private made public against their will." 2
According to Warren and Brandeis, truth or falsehood should have
no bearing on the right to privacy because redress is not sought for the
injury to character, but for injury to the right to privacy.' 3 Thus, the
authors concluded that common law provides the individual with a
weapon to protect his right to privacy from idle or prurient curiosity.11 4
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is in concert with the Warren
and Brandeis view of the right to privacy. Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 652D states:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
vacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate con-
cern to the public." 5
The drafters commented that Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn left open
the question whether the First Amendment protects the publication of
private facts, other than the identity of a rape victim whose name is a
matter of public record, that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and that are not of legitimate public concern." 6 The case also left
open the question whether liability can constitutionally be imposed for
108. Id.
109. Id at 196.
110. Id
111. Id at 214.
112. Id. at 214-15.
113. Id. at 218.
114. Id. at 220.
115. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
116. Id. § 652D Special Note on Relation of § 652D to the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution (1977).
publishing the identity of a rape victim that is not a matter of public
record.
I1. Florida Star v. B.J.F.
Florida Star v. B.J.F. 7 extends first amendment protection to the
publication of rape victims' names that are not a matter of public record.
In Florida Star, the rape victim's name was not a matter of public record,
nor did the case involve a juvenile offender.
A. Facts
On October 20, 1983, an unknown assailant raped and robbed B.J.F.
at knife point while she was crossing a park in Jacksonville, Florida.1 18
The Duval County Sheriff's Department prepared a report that inadver-
tently contained B.J.F.'s full name' 19 and placed the police report in an
unrestricted press room.'20
The Star, a weekly newspaper located in Jacksonville, sent a re-
porter-trainee to the press room to copy the police report for the "Police
Reports" section of the newspaper.12' The trainee copied the report ver-
batim, including B.J.F.'s full name. Jacqueline Lotson, the trainee who
obtained the information, 22 later acknowledged that the Sheriff had
posted a sign in the press room stating that it was against the law to
publish the name of a victim of a sexual battery, 23 and also conceded
that she was aware she was not supposed to copy the name of a rape
victim from a police report.' 24
On October 29, 1983, the article appeared in the "Robberies" sub-
section of "Police Reports."' 25 Despite an internal policy of not publish-
ing the names of sexual offense victims, the newspaper printed B.J.F.'s
full name.126 The article read:
[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brent-
wood Park, which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute
to her bus stop, when an unknown black man ran up behind the
lady and placed a knife to her neck and told her not to yell. The
suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual intercourse with
her before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and
gold necklace. Patrol efforts have been suspended concerning this
117. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
118. Id at 2606.
119. Id at 2605.
120. Id.
121. Ia at 2605-06.
122. Brief for Appellee at 6, Florida Star (No. 87-329).
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id.
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incident because of lack of evidence. 127
B.J.F. suffered emotional distress from the publication of her name.
Not only was she disturbed because fellow workers and acquaintances
mentioned that they had read the article, but she was also upset because
of the effect on her family. Her mother received a number of telephone
calls from a man who threatened to rape B.J.F. again. Ultimately, the
harassment led B.J.F. to move from her home and to obtain a new tele-
phone number. In addition, she sought police protection and mental
health counseling. 128
B. Procedural History
B.J.F. filed suit on September 26, 1984, in the Circuit Court of
Duval County, claiming that the Star negligently violated Florida Statute
section 794.03, which made it unlawful to "print, publish, or broadcast
... in any instrument of mass communication" the name of the victim of
a sexual offense. 129 The Sheriff's Department was also named as a de-
fendant. 130 B.J.F. and the Sheriff's Department reached a settlement of
$2,500 before trial.131
The Star moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that section 794.03
violated its first amendment rights. 132 The Florida trial court ruled that
section 794.03 was constitutional because it contemplated "a proper bal-
ance between the First Amendment and privacy rights, as it applied to a
narrow set of 'rather sensitive... criminal offenses.' ,133 Furthermore,
the court granted a directed verdict in favor of B.J.F., finding the news-
paper negligent per se based on its violation of section 794.03. 134 The
jury awarded B.J.F. $75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in
punitive damages in compliance with the jury instruction that punitive
damages could be awarded upon a finding that the newspaper had "acted
with reckless indifference to the rights of others."' 131
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. 136 The court upheld
the directed verdict for B.J.F. because, under section 794.03, a rape vic-
tim's name is "of a private nature and not to be published as a matter of
127. Id.
128. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2606 (1989).
129. Id. (the Florida district court's decision was not published); FLA. STAT. § 794.03
(1983). The First District Court of Appeal is a state appellate court in Florida. The case
originated in a Florida district court, which is referred to as a circuit court of Florida; the First
District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed, and the Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
130. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id (quoting App. 18-19).
134. Id
135. Id
136. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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law." 1 17 The Star appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, which de-
nied discretionary review.'3 ' The Star then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted review and reversed the District Court of
Appeal, holding that the imposition of damages on the newspaper vio-
lated the First Amendment. 139
C. Holding
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court held that when a newspaper pub-
lishes lawfully obtained, truthful information, the First Amendment pro-
tects the newspaper from punishment unless the punishment is narrowly
tailored to serve a state interest of the highest order."4
Five Justices agreed with the majority opinion, one Justice con-
curred, and three Justices dissented. Justice Marshall delivered the opin-
ion of the Court, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens, and Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice White wrote a dis-
senting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor. 141
D. Majority Opinion
In his opinion, Justice Marshall acknowledged that the present case
bore a "strong resemblance" to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.142 He
was able to distinguish the case, however. 43
Although Cox Broadcasting also involved the publication of a rape
victim's name, the information was obtained from courthouse records
open to public inspection."4 The Court stressed the important public
role the press plays in scrutinizing trials, thereby helping to guarantee
fairness in judicial decisions. 145
Justice Marshall stated that Cox Broadcasting did not control Flor-
ida Star because the press's role of guarding the fairness of trials was not
directly compromised here. The information in question came from a
police report prepared and disseminated at a time when no adversarial
criminal proceedings had begun and no suspect had been identified.'"
The Court based its holding on the principle articulated in Smith v. Daily
137. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 833, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
138. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987).
139. Id. at 2607-08.
140. Id. at 2613.
141. Id. at 2604.
142. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1969); see supra notes 26-40 and
accompanying text.
143. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608.
144. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 494-96.
145. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608.
146. Id,
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Mail Publishing Co.: If the media has lawfully obtained truthful infor-
mation about a matter of public significance, then publication may not be
constitutionally punished, "'absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order.' "147
The Court's justification for applying the Daily Mail principle to
Florida Star was threefold. First, the Court argued that because the for-
mulation only protects publication of information lawfully obtained, the
government retains ample power to protect a rape victim's anonymity.148
The majority reasoned that "[w]here information is entrusted to the gov-
ernment, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost
always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts."149
The majority concluded that the information was lawfully obtained be-
cause the Sheriff's Department inadvertently placed the information
within the media's access even though it was not a matter of public rec-
ord and the press was not permitted to take down the information. The
Court cited Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,150 Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court,"'1 and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn1" 2
for the proposition that the states must implement means that avoid ex-
posure of private information.153
Second, the Court argued that "punishing the press for its dissemi-
nation of information which is already publicly available is relatively un-
likely to advance the interests in the service of which the state seeks to
act." '154 Thus, the Court reasoned that once the information is exposed,
the press constitutionally may publish it despite the method used to ex-
pose the information.
Third, the Court argued that the Daily Mail formulation protects
the press and the public from the dangers of self-censorship that may
result from punishing the media for publishing certain truthful informa-
tion. 155 The Court feared that the press would exercise excessive caution
and not publish truthful information that constitutionally may be pub-
lished due to fear of being held liable for invasion of privacy.
In its application of the Daily Mail rule, the Florida Star majority
concluded that the principle "clearly commands reversal." '156 According
to Daily Mail, a court must first inquire whether the newspaper "lawfully
147. Ia at 2609 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
148. Id
149. Id.
150. 435 U.S. 829 (1978); see discussion supra note 60.
151. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
152. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
153. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609-10.
154. Ia at 2610.
155. IA
156. Id
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obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance."' 7
The Florida Star majority found that "the fact that state officials are not
required to disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspa-
per to receive them when furnished by the government."' 8 Further, the
Sheriff's Department's failure to fulfill its obligation of preventing public
dissemination of rape victims' names under section 794.03 does not make
receipt of the information unlawful. 15 9 The Florida Star majority rea-
soned that the article involved the commission and investigation of a vio-
lent crime that was a matter of paramount public import."6
The majority then turned to the second inquiry: Whether imposing
liability on appellant pursuant to section 794.03 serves "'a need to fur-
ther a state interest of the highest order.'"161 The majority found that
the interests advanced by punishing publication, such as the privacy of
victims of sexual offenses, the physical safety of such victims who may be
subject to retaliation if their names become known to their assailants,
and the goal of encouraging rape victims to report such crimes without
fear of exposure, did not demonstrate a need to further a state interest of
the highest order. 62 The majority conceded that these are "highly sig-
nificant interests," a fact demonstrated by the Florida Legislature's ex-
plicit enactment of a criminal statute prohibiting much of the
dissemination of victims' identities.'63 Nevertheless, the Court articu-
lated three grounds for refusing to impose liability.' 4
The Court first looked to the failure of the Sheriff's Department to
abide by its policy in disseminating information, and concluded that the
imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication
was not a narrowly tailored means of protecting rape victims from expo-
sure."'65 The Court reasoned that the government failed to utilize this far
more limited means of guarding against dissemination and that the press
could not be punished for publishing information they would never have
received but for the government's error.
Justice Marshall next criticized the state court's negligence per se
rule, which did not allow for a case-by-case finding that the disclosure of
a rape victim's full name was a matter highly offensive to a reasonable
person. 166 Further, the majority criticized Florida's imposition of liabil-
ity for publication because section 794.03 lacked a scienter requirement
157. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
158. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610.
159. Id. at 2610-11.
160. Id. at 2611.
161. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id at 2612.
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of any kind, thereby giving less protection to truthful publication than to
defamatory falsehoods regarding a private figure.' 67
Finally, the majority contended that the facial underinclusiveness of
section 794.03 raised serious doubt about whether it served the signifi-
cant interest that B.J.F. invoked in support of afflirmance. 168 Section
794.03 only prevented publication of this information by mass communi-
cation; yet, an individual who disseminated the information to someone
who lives near or works with the victim may cause equally devastating
consequences. 16
9
The majority concluded, "We hold only that where a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punish-
ment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a
state interest of the highest order."' 7 The Court held that imposing lia-
bility under section 794.03 to appellant under the facts of this case would
not serve any interest of the highest order. 171
E. Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia concurred but believed it sufficient to decide the case
based on the underinclusiveness of section 794.03.172 Justice Scalia
stated that he would anticipate that the rape victim's discomfort at the
dissemination of the news of her misfortune among friends and acquaint-
ances would be at least as great as her discomfort at its publication by the
media to strangers, and the law in question fails to prohibit the former."'
Justice Scalia concluded that the law "has every appearance of a prohibi-
tion that society is prepared to impose upon the press but not upon it-
self."174 Therefore, he reasoned, the prohibition does not protect an
interest "of the highest order."' 175
F. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's holding and
would have struck the balance in favor of B.J.F. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion. In
discussing the gravity of the crime of rape and the rape victim's interest
in privacy, Justice White cited his Coker v. Georgia opinion, stating that
167. Id.; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring that a private
figure prove some type of scienter in order to recover for defamation, and leaving it up to the
states to decide if negligence was sufficient or actual malice was required).
168. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2612.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2613.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2614.
175. Id.
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"[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.' "176 Justice
White recognized that the rape of B.J.F. at knifepoint marked only the
beginning of an ordeal that was perpetuated by the Star's negligence.
177
Justice White disagreed with the majority's view that Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn,17 1 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 1
79
and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 180 compelled or supported the
result in Florida Star."' Justice White argued that Cox Broadcasting
was wholly distinguishable from Florida Star on three bases.182 First, in
Cox Broadcasting the victim's name had been disclosed in the hearing in
which her assailants pled guilty; second, judicial records have always
been considered public information; and third, these judicial proceedings
were open as a matter of state law."8 3 Justice White explained that in
Cox Broadcasting the Court warned, "If there are privacy interests to be
protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means
which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private informa-
tion . . .""I For example, states could enact statutes prohibiting the
public dissemination of private information. Justice White indicated that
in this case, Florida had done exactly that by enacting means which
avoid public exposure of private information.' Thus, Cox Broadcasting
does not control in this circumstance.1
86
Justice White also argued that the Court's reliance on the rule from
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. was misplaced.'8 7 Justice White
warned that the rule was introduced in Daily Mail with the cautious
qualifier that such a standard was only suggested by cases that did not
directly control in Daily Mail.' Justice White concluded that the prin-
ciple the Court relied upon was merely a hypothesis, not a standard that
should be applied in future cases, and that "it should not be so uncriti-
cally accepted as constitutional dogma."' 8 9
Justice White distinguished the facts in Florida Star from the facts
in Daily Mail, arguing that Daily Mail involved the disclosure of the
176. Id. at 2614 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977)).
177. Id.
178. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
179. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
180. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
181. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2614 (White, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id, at 2615.
185. Id. (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)).
186. Id. at 2608.
187. Id. at 2615.
188. Id. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
189. Id.
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name of the perpetrator of murder rather than a victim of rape.190 He
stated that "[s]urely the rights of those accused of crimes and those who
are their victims must differ with respect to privacy concerns," 191 and he
argued that the rights of victims are greater than the rights of
criminals. 192 Reasoning that alleged criminals have only minimal rights
to maintain their anonymity pending an adjudication of guilt, he con-
cluded that, compared to criminals, the victims must have infinitely more
substantial rights to maintain their anonymity. 193
Justice White also found that Florida Star was profoundly different
from Oklahoma Publishing Co. 194 The majority suggested that the man-
ner in which the Star obtained B.J.F.'s name was similar to the situation
in Oklahoma Publishing Co., in which a judge invited reporters into his
courtroom and then tried to forbid them from reporting on the proceed-
ings. 195 Justice White argued that the release in the instant case could be
distinguished because posted signs made it clear that names of rape vic-
tims were not matters of public record and were not to be published.196
Further, the Star's reporter admitted that she understood she was not
allowed to transcribe the information and was not supposed to take it
from the police department. 197 Justice White concluded, "Thus, by her
own admission the posting of the incident report did not convey to the
Star's reporter the idea that 'the government considered dissemination
lawful'; the Court's suggestion to the contrary is inapt. 198
According to Justice White, the behavior of the press should not be
excused because the Sheriff's Department mistakenly released private in-
formation. The state had attempted to prevent the exposure of the pri-
vate information by amending its public records statutes to exempt rape
victims' names from disclosure and to forbid officials from releasing this
information. 9 9 Justice White stated that unfortunately, mistakes happen
even when states take measures to prevent public disclosure.20° Accord-
ing to Justice White, "[I]t is not too much to ask the press, in instances
such as this, to respect simple standards of decency and refrain from
publishing a victim's name, address, and/or phone number.120 1
Justice White found inapposite the Court's argument that the appel-
lant was judged under too strict a standard. According to Justice White,
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id at 2616.
195. Id
196. Id
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting 109 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority opinion)).
199. Id. (citing FLA. STAT §§ 119.007(3)(h), 794.03 (1983)).
200. Id
201. Id
the jury found that the appellant acted with reckless indifference, which
is a higher standard than the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. scienter stan-
dard for which the Court argued.2 "2
The majority argued that negligence per se was too strict because it
allowed liability without a case-by-case finding that a reasonable person
would find the disclosure of the private fact to be highly offensive.2°3
Justice White attacked this argument because "the legislature-reflecting
popular sentiment-has determined that disclosure of the fact that a per-
son was raped is categorically a revelation that reasonable people find
offensive." 2"
Justice White found that section 794.03 should not be struck down
due to underinclusiveness. Generally, laws that have been struck down
for underinclusiveness have concerned a legislature singling out one of
the news media or press for adverse treatment or singling out the press
when compared to other similar enterprises.20 5 Justice White found that
"[h]ere, the Florida law evenhandedly covers all 'instrument[s] of mass
communication.' "206 Further, Justice White contended that Florida rec-
ognizes the tort of invasion of privacy through the publication of private
facts, making it possible that neighborhood gossip would be subjected to
liability similar to that of the newspaper.20 7
In his analysis, Justice White also pointed out the irony of the ma-
jority's decision in light of a recent decision by the Court that struck the
balance in favor of the right to privacy.20 8 In that case, United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,20 9
the Court concluded that disclosure of rap sheets would categorically
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.21 0 Justice White logically
reasoned, "The same surely must be true-indeed, much more so-for
the disclosure of a rape victim's name."21
1
Justice White concluded that by holding that protecting a rape vic-
tim's right to privacy is not a state interest of the highest order, the Court
"accepts appellant's invitation... to obliterate one of the most notewor-
thy inventions of the 20th-Century: the tort of [invasion of privacy
202. Id.; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figure was not
required to prove reckless disregard of truth or falsity in order to recover in a defamation
action).
203. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2617 (White, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1983)).
207. Id
208. Id at 2619 (citing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989)).
209. 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989).
210. Id at 1485 (rap sheets are criminal identification records).
211. Id.
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through] the publication of private facts. '2 12 Justice White would pro-
tect "B.J.F.'s desire for privacy and peace of mind in the wake of a horri-
ble personal tragedy. '213 Justice White reasoned that there is no public
interest in publishing the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the
victims of crime, and there is no public interest in immunizing the press
from liability in the rare cases in which a State's efforts to protect a vic-
tim's privacy have failed.214
III. Criticism of Florida Star v. B.J.F.
This section criticizes the majority opinion in Florida Star v. B.J.F.
on four major grounds including: (1) the majority performed a skewed
balancing test; (2) the majority placed unjustified reliance on Daily Mail
and Oklahoma Publishing Co.; (3) the majority ignored the intended ap-
plication of Cox Broadcasting; and (4) the majority applied an improper
test taken from case law that does not control Florida Star.
A. The Majority Applied an Inappropriate Balancing Test
In Florida Star, the majority concluded that punishment could not
be imposed against the Star because the statute involved was not nar-
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.215 The majority
placed too much weight on the freedom of the press to publish rape vic-
tims' names and placed too little weight on the state's interest in protect-
ing the privacy rights of rape victims. The majority gave only passing
reference to the rights of the rape victims themselves.
The majority should have given greater consideration to the particu-
lar plight of the rape victim. Rape is the "ultimate violation of self."216
Publicizing the name of the rape victim adds additional injury to the
victim in the form of embarrassment, humiliation, degradation, and fur-
ther psychological injury.2 17 It also detracts from the rehabilitation of
the victim. 218 Identification of the name of the rape victim through mass
communication adds to the stigma attached to being raped.219
Further, the state has an interest of the highest order in enforcing
statutes such as Florida Statute section 794.03. The state has an interest
in the prosecution of crime and in encouraging rape victims to report
212. Id. at 2618.
213. Id. at 2619.
214. Id
215. Id at 2613; see supra notes 142-71 and accompanying text.
216. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
217. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee at 7-8, Flor-
ida Star (No. 87-329).
218. Id at 8.
219. Id
rapes to facilitate the prosecution and conviction of criminals.220 Crimi-
nal statistics reveal that rape is one of the most unreported crimes; the
main reasons given by victims who do not report rapes are that they
believe it is a private or personal matter, that they have a fear of reprisal,
and that they perceive the police as insensitive and ineffective.221
Balanced against these strong interests in privacy is the minimal in-
terference with freedom of the press concerned in this situation. The
press remains free to publish all of the details of the crime that are of any
legitimate public concern. The press can describe the details of the of-
fense including the name of the perpetrator and any proceedings that
may follow. Thus, the press can still fully inform the public and satisfac-
torily perform its role as public watchdog. The public has a need to
know the details of crime committed so that the community can protect
itself, the name of the rape victim, however, is not an essential element of
the story.2 22
The actual circumstances involved in Florida Star compel the con-
clusion that the state's interest in protecting B.J.F.'s right to privacy
must prevail. B.J.F.'s assailant was still at large when her name was
identified to the public as the rape victim.223 After the publication of her
name, B.J.F. received harassing phone calls, required mental health
counseling, was forced to move from her house to avoid harassment, and
was threatened with rape again.2 24 In light of the extreme needs of a rape
victim and B.J.F.'s particular ordeal, the balance should have been
struck in favor of B.J.F.
Finally, in 1989, a few weeks before the United States Supreme
Court considered Florida Star, the United States Supreme Court held in
favor of protecting the privacy interests of criminals in their rap
sheets.225 In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
For Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court relied on a statutory right
to privacy granted in Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information
Act.226 Certainly, the statutory right to privacy granted by the Florida
statute requires a similar balancing approach. A rape victim's interest in
privacy outweighs a past criminal's interest in privacy and at a minimum
should be treated equally. A rape victim has undergone a traumatic ex-
perience that is deeply degrading and causes the victim to experience
220. Id.
221. Id. at 8-9 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Criminal
Victimization in the United States (1986); National Crime Survey Report, NCJ- 1456, Table
102 at 88-89 (Washington, D.C. 1988)).
222. Id. at 17-18.
223. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2614 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
224. It
225. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 109 S.
Ct. 1468 (1989).
226. Id. at 1485.
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heightened sensitivity. Publishing the name of the victim while the vic-
tim's wounds are still fresh causes the victim to suffer embarrassment
from knowing that what has happened to her is public knowledge. On
the other hand, a past criminal has had time to deal with society's reac-
tion to the crime that he or she personally committed.
B. The Majority Unjustifiably Relies on Daily Mail and Oklahoma
Publishing Co.
The Florida Star majority relied heavily on Daily Mail and
Oklahoma Publishing Co. to establish that the First Amendment forbids
the punishment of a newspaper for publication of a rape victim's name
unless it furthers a state interest of the highest order and is unlawfully
obtained.227 The Supreme Court's application of these two cases to the
facts of Florida Star is subject to criticism.
The facts presented in Daily Mail were completely different from the
facts presented in Florida Star. In Daily Mail, the name of a juvenile
who was accused of shooting and killing a fifteen-year-old student was
published by a newspaper.228 The ordeal that a rape victim is involunta-
rily forced to endure cannot be analogized to the predicament a juvenile
offender finds himself or herself in after killing another human being. A
rape victim's right to privacy must be worthy of more protection than
that of a juvenile offender. The voluntary nature of committing a crime
results in an assumption of the risk of losing one's privacy interest in
one's identity. This element of voluntary action is not present in a rape
victim's involuntary, unconsenting submission to force and sexual abuse.
Further, the statute at issue in Daily Mail only applied to newspaper
publication. Other channels of publication were left open, and therefore
the statute failed to accomplish its stated purpose.2 29 In contrast, Florida
Statute section 794.03 applies to "any instrument of mass communica-
tion" and therefore avoids the problems associated with
underinclusiveness.230
Oklahoma Publishing Co. is also distinguishable in important ways
from Florida Star. In Oklahoma Publishing Co., the name of a juvenile
who was accused of second-degree murder was published by the press.2 a1
As previously stated in discussing Daily Mail, the two situations (the
rape victim and the juvenile delinquent) are not comparable.232
Further, the majority in Florida Star wrongfully concluded that the
227. See Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609-12.
228. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1979).
229. Id. at 104-05.
230. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1983).
231. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 309-10 (1977).
232. See supra notes 190-93, 228 and accompanying text.
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information was lawfully obtained and published. 33 In Oklahoma Pub-
lishing Co., the press was present at the hearing and the parties had full
knowledge of the presence of the press. Thus, the information was law-
fully obtained.234 On the other hand, the Star reporter obtained the in-
formation in an entirely different manner. The Sheriff's Department
failed to keep the document confidential and inadvertently allowed the
press access to the information, but the mere fact that the government
created an opportunity to violate a law easily should not absolve the
press of responsibility for violating the law.235 Florida Statute section
794.03 places responsibility on the person publishing the information re-
gardless of the method used to obtain the information.2 36 The error of
the Sheriff's Department did not place the actions of the press beyond
the reach of the statute. Just as a bank customer who receives a cash
windfall because of a teller's error cannot legally enjoy the money, the
press must not take advantage of illegally obtained information.2 37
C. The Majority Ignored the Limited Application of Cox Broadcasting
In analyzing Florida Star, it is particularly significant that Justice
White wrote the majority opinion in Cox Broadcasting and the dissenting
opinion in Florida Star. This suggests that Florida Star was the type of
case the Court had in mind in Cox Broadcasting when it indicated that a
case could arise in which the rape victim's right to privacy should pre-
vail.238 Justice White limited his opinion in Cox Broadcasting to the spe-
cific circumstances of the case and left open the possibility that a
situation might exist in which a rape victim's rights would outweigh the
rights of the press under the First Amendment. 239 B.J.F.'s name was not
a matter of public record and therefore was outside of the holding of Cox
Broadcasting. The Star managed to obtain B.J.F.'s name; under Florida
law and under the Star's own policy, however, the Star was prohibited
from publishing B.J.F.'s name. Thus, in this case, B.J.F.'s interest in
privacy outweighed the rights of the press.
D. The Majority Applied an Improper Test
The test applied in Florida Star, that officials may not constitution-
ally punish publication of information absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order,2'" is a vague standard and does not fit into
233. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2611-12 (1989).
234. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 430 U.S. at 311.
235. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee at 13, Florida
Star (No. 87-329).
236. Id at 14.
237. Id at 13-14.
238. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975).
239. Id
240. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (1989).
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the previous categories of first amendment law. As Justice White pointed
out, the test was first introduced in Daily Mail as a mere suggestion or
hypothesis that should not be uncritically accepted as constitutional
dogma.241
Perhaps a more appropriate test would be a substantial interest test
or a clear and present danger test. Using these tests, the Court has al-
lowed restrictions on freedom of speech to prohibit advocacy of illegal
action242 and to prohibit the burning of draft cards despite the expressive
component of this type of activity.243 These tests are not as heavily
skewed in favor of the press and allow for a more equal treatment of the
two valued interests.
IV. Conclusion
The privacy right of a rape victim necessarily outweighs the right of
the press to publish the victim's name when it is not a matter of public
record. The plight of the rape victim presents the clearest and most de-
manding case for the right to privacy and the right to prevent the publi-
cation of truthful private facts. The victim's interest in privacy and
solitude following a horrifying ordeal, coupled with the state's interest in
having crimes reported and in protecting its citizens' rights to privacy,
justify punishing a newspaper or other form of mass media for publica-
tion of the name of a rape victim when it is of no possible legitimate
public concern. The majority's holding in Florida Star ignores the plight
of the rape victim and wipes out this form of the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy. If this tort is to coexist with the First Amendment, then rape vic-
tims whose names are not a matter of public record must be protected
because their predicament presents the most compelling justification for
the tort.
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